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PEOPLE

[Crim. No. 13154.

v.

HUTCHINSON

In Bank.

[71 C.2d

June 18, 1969.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and R.espondent, v. ROBERT BEE
HUTCHINSON, Defendant and Appellant.
[la,lb] Poisons - Narcotics - Evidence - Sufficiency - Unlawful Possession.-The evidence was sufficient to support a verdict finding defendant guilty of possession of marijuana where
it was shown that, although his brothers shared, and guests
had access to, his bedroom in which boxes of marijuana were
found hidden in the closet and under a bed, defendant fled
from his home when his mother confronted him with the contraband, demanded an explanation and threatened to call the
police.
[2] Id.-Narcotics-Offenses-TIlegal .Possession.-Unlawful possession of narcotics is established by proof that the accused
exercised dominion and control over the contraband, that he
had knowledge of its presence, and that he had knowledge that
the material
a narcotic.
[31 Id. - Narcotics - Evidence - Access Available to Another.When contraband is found in a place to which a defendant
and others have access and over which none has exclusive control, no sharp line can be drawn to distinguish the congeries
of facts which will, and that which will not, constitute
evidence of defendant's knowledge of its presence, and thus,
proof of opportunity of access to a place where narcotics are
found, without more, will not support
finding of unlawful
posseSSIOn.
[4] Id.-Narcotics-Instructions-Flight.-In a prosecution for
possession of marijuana, the trial court. did not err in instructing the jury pursuant to Pen. Code, § 1127c, on the significance of flight, where it was shown that, after defendant's
mother had confronted him with marijuana found in his bedroom, demanded an explanation and threatened to eall the'
police, he had fled from his home, and where the· jury. could
have rejected his explanation that his flight had been only
to escape his mother's emotional outburst and could reasonably
have inferred, instead, a consciousness of guilt.
.
[5] Trial-Verdicts-Impeachment.-By decisional law, the rule
prohibiting jurors from impeaching their own verdict is inapplicable to the use of jurors' affidavits to prove that one
or more of the jurors concealed bias or prejudice on voir
dire, or that a juror was mentally incompetent at the time of
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a

McK. Dig. References: [1] Poisons, § 15(3); [2] Poisons, § 9.2
(1) (a); [3] Poisons, § 15(6); [4] Poisons, § 16·( 4); [5-7] Trial,
§ 206; f81 Trial, § 2()6; Criminal Law, § 944(5).
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trial, or that a juror did not intend to follow the court's instructions on the law and concealed that intention on voir dire.
[6] Id.-Verdicts-Impeachment.-The only improper influences
that may be proved under Evid. Code, § 1150, to impeach a
yerdict are those open to sight, hearing and the other senses,
and thus subject to corroboration.
[7] Id.-Verdicts-Impeachment.-Under Evid. Code, § 1150, jurors are competent witnesses to prove objective facts to impeach
a yerdict. (Overruling, to the extent they are contrary to this .
conclusion, Sopp v. Smith (1963) 59 Ca1.2d 12 [27 Cal.Rptr.
593, 377 P.2d 649]; Kollert v. Cundiff (1958) 50 Ca1.2d 768
[329 P.2d 897], and similar cases.)
[8] Id.-Verdict--Impeachment.-In a criminal prosecution, it was
reyersible error for the court to rest its denial. of defendant's
motion for new trial on the ground that the jury could not
impeach its own verdict, where the conduct complained of in
the affidavit of the juror concerned was "likely to have influenced the verdict improperly" (Evid. Code, § 1150), ana consisted of impatient remarks and angry behavior on the bailiff's
part, late in the evening, in "rushing" the jury into reaching
a verdict.
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APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County granting probation and from an order denying motion
for a new trial in a prosecution for possession of marijuana.
John C. Spence, Jr., Judge. Appeal from order denying new
trial dismissed; orders vacated with directions.
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Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James,
.Assistant Attorney General,and Robert T. Jacobs, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant R.obert Bee Hutchinson was
aCcused by information of possession of marijuana for sale,
and a jury found him guilty of the lesser included offense of
possession of marijuana. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11530.) He
appeals from the order granting probation and from the order
denying a new trial. The latter appeal is dismissed. (Pen.
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Trial, § 256; Am.Jur., Trial (1st ed § 1105
et seq).
[8] Time jury m~y be kept together on disagreement in criminal
ease, note, 93 A.L.R.2d 627.
.
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Code, § 1237.) Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict and that the trial court committed
prejudicial error in instructing on flight and in refusing to
consider the affidavit of a juror in ruling on the motion for
new trial.
Defendant lived at his mother's and stepfather's home and
shared a bedroom with two brothers and a stepbrother. For
about a week before July 25, 1966, only defendant and one
.brother occupied the bedroom, since the other two boys were
away on vacation. On that date, while cleaning the bedroom
and its closet, defendant's mother discovered a box containing
stems and green plant material 'that appeared to her to be
roots. She was unable to identify the clothing that covered the
box as belonging to anyone of the boys and testified that "it
had to belong to all of the boys, because it's there where they
throw their real dirty clothes. ' ,
She continued cleaning and discovered another box under
defendant's bed. Defendant's brother Ronnie, who was then
16 years old, also used the same bed from time to time. The
contents of the second box resembled tobacco leaves, but Mrs.
Long could not tell what they were. At the trial it was established that both boxes contained marijuana. After discovering
the second box :hirs. Long became suspicious. When defendant
came home with his stepfather after work about 5 0 'clock in
the afternoon, Mrs. Long told her husband about the boxes
while defendant was in another room. She then called defendant to the living room and accused him of knowing to whom
the boxes and their contents belonged because she felt "that
he's the oldest of the children [he was then 18 years oldfandwhen we're not at home, he's responsible. And I was scream-,
ing at him, you know, and things, really was.. . . I told him
if he didn't tell me where it came from, I was going to call
the police." Defendant replied that "it wasn't his and he
didn't know anything about it." Defendant and his mother
became emotional and began to cry. Defendant said to his
stepfather, "God, dad, do something with mother. I can'1'
stand this." lIe then left the living room and went toward
his bedroom.
About 25 minutes later Mrs. Long called the police, who
arrived within half an hour. Defendant had left the house
through his bedroom window. About half an hour after the
police had left with the boxes, defendant called his home from
a telephone some five blocks away and asked his stepfather if
his mother was all right. Mr. Long replied that she had

.2d

June 1969]

PEOPLE

v.

HUTCHINSON

345

[71 C.2d 342; 78 Ca1.Rptr. 196. 455 P.2d 132]

uffi
ted
to
for
and
For
one
ere

I

~der
ithen

The

~-

~tah_)
.

rIng
dant
k in
loxes
endrhom
that
and
eam-,
him
call
d he
)ther
) his
~an 't'
~ard

who
lOl

~

)

ttre

from
er if
had

"calmed down" and tbat " We called the police." Defendant asked, "Well, you want me to come home~" and Mr.
Long replied ' , No, no. I'll come and get you." He did so,
and the next morning defendant and Mr. and Mrs. Long went
to the police station, where defendant was placed under
arrest.
Defendant testified that he had not seen the two boxes at
any time until he came home on the day his mother confronted him with them. He had never seen any of his brothers
with material like that found in the two boxes and had never
seen marijuana in his home. He admitted that he had seen
marijuana in cigarettes at other places and knew that it was a
green leafy substance similar to tobacco. He further testified
that his mother did not tell him that she was going to call the
police and that he did -not hear her call them. He left the
house by going out the window only to avoid further conflict
with his mother.
On the evening before the discovery of the marijuana,
friends of defendant and his brothers and sisters had visited
the Long house for a swimming party. Mr. and Mrs. Long
went out and le~t defendant in charge. The boys who attended
such swimming parties dressed and undressed in the Long
boys' bedroom. Defendant's brother Ronnie had been away
on vacation for several days but returned after defendant was
arrested. When told that defendant was to be released on bail
and was coming home, Ronnie left the house, ostensibly to go
to school, but instead to stay with his father in Oklahoma.
[la] The evidence was sufficient to support the verdict.
[2] "Unlawful possession of narcotics is established by
proof (1) that the accused exercised dominion and control
Over the contraband, (2) that he had knowledge of its presence, and (3) that the accused had knowledge that the
material was a narcotic." (People v. Groom (1964) 60 Ca1.2d
694, 696 [36 Cal.Rptr. 327, 388 P .2d 359].) [3] When contraband is found in a place to which a defendant and others
have access and over which none has exclusive control "no
sharp line can be drawn to distinguish the congeries of facts
which will and that which will not constitute sufficient evidence of a defendant's knowledge of the presence of a narcotic . . . . " (People v. Redrick (1961) 55 Ca1.2d 282, 287
[10 Cal.Rptr. 823, 359 P.2d 255].)
. [lb] If the evidence showed only that two boxes containlllg marijuana were found hidden in the closet and under a
h('d in a bedroom defendant shared with his brothers and to
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which guests also had access, the applicable rule would be that
, 'proof of opportunity of access to a place where narcotics are
found, without more, will not support a finding of unlawful
possession." (People v. Redrick, supra, 55 Ca1.2d 282, 285.)
There was more in this case, however; for defendant fled from.
his home when his mother confronted him: with the marijuana,
demanded ,an explanation, and threatened to call the police.
[4] The jury was not required to accept defendant's explanation that his flight was motivated only by'a wish to escape
from his mother's emotional outburst. The jury could reasonably infer that his flight reflected consciousness of guilt
and that he therefore knowingly possessed the marijuana
found in the bedroom and' closet. It follows that the trial
court did not err in instructing the jury on the significance of
flight purs~nt to Penal Code section 1127c.
In support of his motion for a new trial' defendant submitted an affidavit of a juror alleging misconduct on the part -of
, the bailiff.1 The trial court refused to consider the affidavit on
the ground that: "They [the jury] can't impeach their own
verdict. "
, The. rule that jurors cannot impeach their verdicts,
although almost universally assailed by the commentators as
V'I hereby certify and declare that I was a juror on the above-entitled
,case and that the following is my recollection of the activities of the
bailiff in regard to this case.
"The Judge stated from the Bench that we would go to dinner at
6: 00 p.m., if we had not reached a verdict. At 6: 00 p.m. we were not
.. -taken to dinner.
"It was not until about 6 :30 when the bailiff came in, and at our request. At this time inquiry of him was made as to when we would get
to dinner. At this point he replied words to the effect: 'If you go out to
eat; you will be locked up overnight.' At some time during the deliberations in the late afternoon, after 6: 30, the bailiff came in and said words
to this effect: 'If you knew what was· going on out there, you would be
shivering in your boots.' At one time when he entered, around 7: 00, he.
!;Cemed quite angry and put out. He said words, 'This is it.' We replied,
'Give us a few more minutes and we can come to a verdict.' He gave us
about five or ten minutes and said if we had not reached a verdict that
was it. I feel that ·we were definitely rushed by the bailiff. When the
bailiff came in the last time, I feJt we just had to make up our minds
and that was it when he came in. He had come in three times and each
time he seemed and spoke in a more angry manner. It was my opinion
that the entire jury was uncertain as to how to proceed. As a result of
his actions, everyone said, 'Hurry up.' It is my opinion that I hurried
my verdict and agreed to the compromise verdict in order to prevent the
jury from being locked up overnight.
"There were about four of us who felt from the beginning of deliberations that he was not guilty. I was the last holdout on the jury. The
verdict for the lesser included was my verdict and was the verdict of the
entire jury. I heard no vulgarity. I would not desire to sit on another _
jury if it was handled in the same way that this jury was handled by
the bailiff."
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without foundation in logic or policy,2 has been a common
law rule in this state since our first volume of reports. (See
People v. Baker (1851) 1 Cal. 403.) The rule first sprang full
blown and unprecedented3 from the opinion of Lord Mansfield in Vaise v. D~laval (1785) 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944,
and was based on an extension of the principle nerno t'ltrpiiudinern suam allegans audietur-no man shall be heard to
allege his own turpitude. 4 With several exceptions, the rule
was adopted by the courts in American jurisdictions, includ-·
ing California, even though the principle on which it was
originally based was largely repudiated as applied to other
areas of the law of evidence. (See 8 Wigmore, Evidence
CMcNaughtonrev. 1961) § 2352, p. 696.)
The erroneous view that the California rule is statutory
(see People v. Gidney (1937) 10 Cal.2d 138, 146 [73 P.2d
1186]) had its roots in Boyce v. California Stage Co. (1864)
25 Cal. 460, 475. Before 1862, the rule was not refle~ted in any
statute but was based on the court's view of public policy.
(See People v. Baker (1851) 1 Cal. 403; Arnsby v. Dickhouse
(1854) 4 Cal. 102; lVilson v. Berryrnan (1855) 5 Cal. 44 [63
Am.Dec. 78 J .) In 1862, apparently in reaction to a scandal,
the Legislature amended section,193 of the Practice Act (now
§ 657 of Code Civ.. Proc.) to provide that verdicts obtained by
"resort to the determination of chance" might be impeached
by affidavits of the jurors. (Stats. 1862, ch. 48, § 1, p. 38; see
People v. Ritchie (1895) 12 Utah180, 194 [42 P. 209J.) The
court in Boyce found that in creating the exception to the
general rule, the Legislature "upon the maxim, expressio
tl1lius, excl1.lsio alien:u,s est, has declared that verdicts of a
different class shall not be so impeached." (Boyce v. Califor- .
fZia, Stage Co., supra, 25 Cal. 460, 475.) This reading of the
statute was followed in People v. AzofJ (1895) 105 Cal. 632,
634 [39 P. 59], and later cases. (E.g., People v. Reid (1924)
Maguire, Evidence, Common Sense and Common Law (1947)
§§ 2345-2354;
!\ott' (1956) 56 Colum.L.Rev. 952; Note (1947) 47 Colum.L.Rev. 1373;
L(':I\"itt, The Jury at Work, 13 Hastings L.J. (1962) 415,445-446; Note
(]!I:i!l) 10 Hastings L.J. 319; Note (1956) 54 Mich.L.Rey. 1003; Note
<,HI4~) 47 ).rich.L.Rev. 261; Note (1915) 64 U.Pa.L.R,ev. 86; Falknor,
!'/-!'~1/.~;(, p'olicies Affecting Admissibility (1956) 10 Rutgers L.Rey. 574,
.,.1 h)HS; N oto (1958) 25 U.Chi.L.Rev. 360 ; Note (1951) 37 Va.L.Rev.
(S:H}I, t-;6~; Kote (1966) 41 \Vash.L.Rey. 346. See contra Note (1955) 43
II .L.Hp\,. 729.
l' ~~l'(' ('al'lier cases to the contrary cited and discussed in 8 \\Tjgmorc,
.\'i( l'1l('C OreNaughton rev. 1961) § 23.52, pp. 696-697, fll. 2.
"Tile> jurors in Vaise v. Delaval lind reached their verdict by lot,
tOIl( ud that Lord Mansfield classed as a very hjgh misdemeanor.
2St'C

8~-HO; 8 'Vigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961)
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195 Cal. 249, 261 [232 P. 457, 36 A.L.R. 1435] ; People v.
Gidney, supra, 10 Ca1.2d 138, 146.)
[5] Although purporting to recognize legisla.tive preemption of the field, the court in Gidney also acknowledged the
existence of the judicial exception to the rule that allows
jurors' affidavits to be used to prove that one or more of the
jurors concealed bias or prejudice on voir dire. (People v.
Gidney, supra, 10 Ca1.2d 138, 146; see lVilliams v. Bridges
(1934) 140 Cal.App. 537 [35 P.2d 407].) This exception is
now well settled (see e.g., Kol.lert v. C'ltndiff (1958) 50 Ca1.2d
768, 773-774 [329 P.2d 897] ; People v. Castaldia (1959) 51
Ca1.2d 569, 572 [335 P.2d 104]) and has beene;xtended to
allow the use of juror affidavits to show that a juror was
mentally incompetent at the tilne of trial (Ch'ltrch v. Capital
Freight Lines (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d246, 248 [296 P.2d
563]) and to show that a juror did not intend to follow the
court's instructions
on the law and had concealed that inten-tion on voir dire. (Noll v. Lee (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 81 [34
Cal.Rptr. 223].)
Thus the courts have not followed the view that the Legis·
lature has enacted the common law rule, but on the contrary
have made changes in the rule they deemed dictated by
experience and justice. The Legislature has never sought to
restrict the power of the courts to enla.rge the area in which
jurors may impeach their verdicts. The rule owes its continuing vitality, not to statute, but to the force of stare decisis ,
(see Sopp v. Smith (1963) 59 Ca1.2d 12, 15-16 [27Cal.Rptr.
593, 377 P .2d 649] (dissen ting opinion, Peters, J.) ; People v.
"-"-'--'-"-:Azoff, s'ltpra,105Cal. -632,634 )aIid toavariety'oflegal-'
arguments and public policies that, like the discredited policy
~gainst self-stultifying testimony, cannot withstand careful
analysis.
In Kollert v. Cundiff, supra, 50 Cal.2d 768, 773-774, we
stated the rationale presently underlying the rule: "-The
problem involves the' balancing of two conflicting policies. It
is, of course, necessary, to prevent instability, of verdicts,
fraud, and harassment of jurors, and, on the other hand, it is
desirable to give the losing party relief from wrongful conduct by the jury. The court in lJlcDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S.
264, 267-269 [59 IJ.Ed, 1300, 1302.1303, 35 S.Ct. 783], after
discussing these policies and stating that the wrong to the
indiyidual was the lesser of two evils, concluded that as a
general rule the affidavits [of jurors] should be excluded but
that there might be instances where the rule could not be
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applied without' violating the plainest principles of justice. ' "
(See also, Saltzman v. Sunset Tel. etc. Co. (1899) 125 Cal.
501, 504-505· [58 P. 169]; People v. AzofJ, supra, 105 Cal.
632, 635.) Upon further deliberation we have concluded that
there is no substantial conflict of policies and that the wrong
to the individual cannot be considered the lesser of two evils.
In the Evidence Code the Legislature has determined that
certain facts may be proved to impeach a verdict. "Upon an
inquiry as to the validity of a verdict, any otherwise admissi~
ble evidence may be received as to statements made, or conduct, conditions, or events occurring, either within or without
the jury room, of such a character as is likely to have influenced the verdict improperly. ]:'Io evidence is admissible to
show the effect of such statement, conduct, condition, or event
upon a juror either in influencing him to assent to or dissent
from the verdict or concerning the mental processes by which
it was determined." (Evid. Code, § 1150, subd. (a).) ·This
distinction between proof of overt acts, objectively ascertainable, and proof of the subjective reasoning processes of the
individual juror, which can be neither corroborated nor disproved, has been advocated by commentators (se e.g., 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961) §§ 2349, 2352-2354;
Note (1956) 56 Colum.L.Rev. 952; Note (1959) 10 Hastings
L.J. 319; Note (1956) 54 Mich.L:Rev. 1003; Note (1948) 47
~lich.L.Rev. 261), adopted by the Uniform Rules of Evidence
(rules 41 and 44) and the Model Code of Evidence (rule
301), and has been the basic limitation on proof set by the
leading decisions allowing jurors to impeach their verdicts.
(See Wright v. Illinois &; Miss. Tel. Co. (1866) 20 Iowa 195;
Perry v. Bailey (1874) 12 Kan. 415, 418-419; State v. Kociolek (1955) 20 N.J. 92, 99-103 [118 A.2d 812, 58 A:L.R.2d
545]. See also, People v. Stokes (1894) 103 Cal. 193, 196-197
[ 37 P. 207, 42 Am.St.Rep. 102] ; Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts
and :Magistrates (1969) Rule 6-06 and Advisory Committee's
Notes, pp. 117-119.)
Although section 1150 does not alter the rule against
~mpeaehment of a verdict by the jurors,5 its limitation of
ulll)(>a.chment evidence to proof of overt conduct, conditions,
e~·~nts, and sta.tements, as suggested by the commentators,
'·ltiates the major policy arguments supporting the common

!'

fr~~l'('tion 1150, subdivision (b), reads as follows: "Nothing in this code

('ds the law relating to the competence of a juror to give evidence to
llul1l'aeh or support a verdict."
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law rule. (See Sopp v. Sinith, supra, 59 Cal.2d 121 15-20 (dissenting opinion, Peters, J.).) This .limitation prevents one
juror from upsetting a verdict of the. whole jury by impugning his own or his fellow jurors' mental processes or reasons
for assent or dissent. [6] The only imprope.r influences
that may be proved under .section. 1150 to impeach a verdict,
therefore, are those open to sight, hearing, and the other
senses and thus subject to corroboration. (See.Note(1956) 54
Mich.L.R.ev. 1003, 1005; Perry v. Bailey (1874) 12 Kan. 415,
419. ) . " [T] hese facts can be easily proved or disproved. There
is . invariably Jittle disagreement as to their occurrence."
(Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Evi·dence (1963) 80.) Experience W other jurisdictions that
recognize the competency of a juror to impeach his verdict
. indicates that the admission of jurors' affidavits within the
limits set by section 1150 will not result in the. widespread
upsetting of verdicts. (See Note (1958).25 U.ChLL.Rev. 360,
372, fn. 78; Note (1951) 37 Va.L.Rev. 849, 862.) Experience
in this state with the present exceptions "indicates that the
fears of jury tampering are unrealistic" (6 Cal. Law Revision Com. Reports (1964) 611), and there is no reason to
believe that permitting proof of other overt misConduct is
more likely to encourage post verdict tampering wit}! the jury
than do the present exceptions.
;
Admission of jurors' affidavits within the .limits set by sec. tion 1150 protects the stability of verdicts, and allows proof
by the best evidence of misconduct on the part of either jurors
. or third ~rties that should be. exposed, misconduct upon
which no verdict should· be based. (See· Peri. Code, § 1181 ;------~
Code. Civ. Proc., § 657.) The content and conduct or deliberations may already be exposed by jurors at the trial of one who
attempted corruptly to influence the verdict, or, in the case of
the present two exceptions ·to the rule, at motion for new triaI:.
Admission of· this best evidence of misconduct or improper
influence at a ·motion for new trial, therefore, would not
. present a breach in the post verdict privacy of jury' deliberations. It would merely insure that evidence of misconduct will
be available to the courts, freeing them to· determine the substantive questions of whether the particular misconduct is a
recognized ground for new trial and whether it has prejudiced the losing Mrty. Admissi9n of jurors' affidavits should
also have a further prophylactic effect of stripping from all
prejudicial misconduct whatever veil of. post verdict secrecy is
now reserved for the proper deliberations of the jury. "[T]o -
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hear such proof would have a tendency to diminish such p-ractices alld to purify the jury room, by rendering such improprieties capable and probable of exposure, and consequently
deterring jurors from resorting to them." (Wright v. Illinois
etc. Tel. Co., supra, 20 Iowa 195,211.)
[7] We therefore hold that jurors are competent witnesses
to prove objective facts to impeach a verdict under section
1150 of the Evidence Code. To the extent that Sopp v. Smith,
supra, 59 Cal.2d 12, Kollert v.' Cundiff, supra, 50 Cal.2d 768,
and similar cases are contrary to our conclusion herein, they
are overruled .
[8] The bailiff's remarks and the tone of· their delivery
constitute statements and conduct that are "likely to have
. influenced the verdict improperly." (Evid. Code, § 1150; see
People v. Gidney, supra, 10 Cal.2d 138, 146.) The affidavit of'
the juror is therefore admissible to prove the statements and
conduct of the bailiff. Since the trial court refused to consider
this competent evidence, defendant is entitled to a redetermina.tion of his motion for new trial.
The order granting probation and the order denying the
motion for new trial are vacated with directions to the trial
court to hear and determine the motion for new trial in
accordance with this opinion and to take such further proceedings as are appropriate.
l\fcComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., l\:1.osk, J., Burke, J.,
and Sullivan, J., concurred.

~pon_
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Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied July 16, 1969.
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